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RIGHT OF A TRUSTEE TO BID AT
FORECLOSURE SALE
OTno H. BREIDENBACH
T HE right of "a trustee under a trust deed to bid, where the trust
deed securing the bonds does not expressly confer upon him the
right to bid for trust property at foreclosure sale, is constantly being
questioned in connection with the form of judgment to be entered, on
petitions for such authority before sale or again on motions for con-
firmation. Since the trustee purchases for the benefit of all bond-
holders, the purchase involves no cash distribution. The trustee need
pay in cash only such portion of the bid as represents prior charges,
such as expense of sale, and may pay the balance by having the amount
thereof credited on all of the bonds pro rata. Many trust deeds of
course contain provisions expressly authorizing trustee purchase and
the validity of such provisions has generally been sustained over the
objection of minority bondholders insisting upon the usual type of sale
involving a cash distribution for dissenters.
The cases are sharply divided and differ widely in their views upon
the question of the right of trustee purchase in the absence of express
provision in the trust deed. One of the earliest cases confirming the
right of the trustee to bid for the benefit of all bondholders is
Nay Aug Lumber Company v. Scranton Trust Company,' a Pennsyl-
vania case. The rule there declared became known as the Pennsylvania
rule. The opposite view seems to have been first taken by a federal
'.Nay Aug Lumber Company v. Scranton Trust Company, 240 Pa. 500, 87 At.
843 (1913).
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court in the leading case of Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equity Trust
Company,2 decided in the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has not passed upon the question. The circuit courts
however have quite generally authorized trustees to purchase at the
foreclosure sale for the use and benefit of all bondholders, granting
such authority either by the decree itself through appropriate provi-
sions or by order made upon petition before sale or have approved the
purchase by the trustee upon confirmation. The better practice, I
believe, is to grant such authority by the decree itself where the cir-
cumstances warrant it. By doing so proper provisions may be made in
time for determining the rights and status of bondholders after sale;
also for the purpose of cutting off the rights of creditors of bond-
holders, who might assert claims to the property after the sale. Those
courts that have recognized the right of trustee purchase in the absence
of express provision in the trust deed have, in most instances, grounded
their decisions upon the principle that courts of equity have inherent
power to authorize a departure from the provisions of the trust instru-
ment in cases of exigency or emergency, so that the principal purpose
of the trust may effectually be carried out, or have declared that such
power in the absence of express provision in the trust mortgage must
be implied.
It is quite futile to try to reconcile the various decisions upon the
question. The general principle for such authority was clearly stated
in Nay Aug Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust Company, a case frequently
cited, where it was said: "It is difficult to see why a trustee should not
bid at a foreclosure sale, if it be necessary to protect the interest of the
bondholders. * * * Where such power is not explicitly given, it may
very well be implied. * * * It seems clear that the trustee has implied
power to purchase for the bondholders. At least he has such implied
power to bid in their behalf in an amount equal to the principal and
interest due on the mortgage. * * * It has been said that the duty of
the trustee does not end with the institution and prosecution of the
foreclosure suit, but his duty requires him to attend the sale and pro-
tect the right of the bondholders, and if necessary to bid in the prop-
erty; this right it seems exists independently of the terms of the mort-
gage."3 In that case the trustee had not petitioned the court prior to
the sale for authority to purchase on behalf of the bondholders, nor
were there any general provisions in the judgment of foreclosure grant-
ing such right. It was held notwithstanding that he had the right acting
in good faith to make the bid for the protection of all bondholders.
2 Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equity Trust Company, 35 F. (2d) 513 (C.C.A_
10th, 1929).
3 Nay Aug Lumber Company v. Scranton Trust Company, 240 Pa. 500, 87 AtI.
843, 844 (1913).
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It is of course the general rule, well sustained by authority, that
one who holds property in a fiduciary capacity cannot purchase that
property at his own sale. This rule applies to trustees generally, such
as executors, administrators, agents, corporate officers and testamen-
tary trustees. The rule should not, however, be confused with the ques-
tion of trustee purchase where the purchase is for the benefit and use
of all bondholders.
No one view of this question is entitled to be regarded as estab-
lished by the weight of authority. I believe that the doctrine that the
trustee may be authorized to purchase for the benefit of bondholders is
followed in more of the jurisdictions which have considered the point.
The authorities are reviewed at great length by the Kansas court in the
case of the First National Bank v. Neil,4 and by the Illinois court in
the recent case, Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Robbin.5 Both are
able and learned opinions discussing the authorities exhaustively. The
Kansas case upholds the right of the court to authorize trustee pur-
chase while the Illinois case repudiates the doctrine. In the former case,
the court considers the Pennsylvania rule more convincing than that
obtaining in the federal courts, holding that the trial court properly
authorized the trustee to purchase, at least under circumstances where
there were no bidders when the property was first offered, basing such
right upon the implied power of the trustee and upon the right of the
court of equity to depart from the terms of the trust deed itself when
necessary to afford adequate protection to bondholders. The petition in
that case was made for authority to bid, which was opposed by one
of the minority bondholders on the ground that if the trustee were
allowed to bid in the property for the benefit of bondholders, the prop-
erty would have to be partitioned among bondholders or again resold
by the trustee and that the dissenting bondholder did not desire to
participate as beneficiary in the purchase of the property but desired
to receive his proportionate amount of the proceeds of the sale in
satisfaction of his bond. Oddly enough, this objection that partition
might be necessary seems to have been repeatedly asserted by dissent-
ing bondholders in the cases considered. In upholding the right of the
trustee to bid, the court, in the Kansas case just mentioned, based its
decision upon the broad ground stating: "What were the rights of the
minority bondholder as opposed to the remaining bondholders? While
his rights are not in any sense to be ignored, over-looked or frittered
away, can he determine the course of action that the remaining bond-
holders must pursue? * * * We are not convinced by the reasoning of
Equitable Trust Company v. U. S. Oil & Refinery Company and Wer-
4 First National Bank v. Neil, 137 Kan. 436, 20 P. (2d) 528 (1933).
5 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robbin, (Ill. 1935) 198 N.E. 4.
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ner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Company [those are the lead-
ing federal cases denying the right of trustee purchase], that, at least
under the deed of trust under consideration, the holder of the one
hundred dollar bond or eleven one hundred dollar bonds can say that
he may gamble as he will with his bonds and be the sole judge of
whether the trustee can bid for him or not and that the court cannot
say, under all of the equities of the case, that the trustee shall bid on
behalf of all the bondholders. We are persuaded that the holding of
the Pennsylvania court in Nay Aug Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust
Company, supra, that there is no reason why a trustee shall not be
permitted to bid at a foreclosure sale, if it be necessary to protect
the interest of bondholders, is more reasonable and equitable and
should be followed." '6
Even those cases recognizing the right of the trustee to purchase
quite generally hedge him about with the statement that a positive and
definite rule cannot be laid down as to when the court should make an
order permitting the trustee under a deed of trust where specific
authority is lacking to bid on behalf of bondholders and that the terms
and conditions to be fixed by the court must. necessarily depend on the
existing facts and circumstances.
In an Illinois appellate court decision, Straus v. Chicago Title &
Trust Company,7 the rule was laid down that notwithstanding the lack
of specific authority in the trust deed, the trustee not only had such
implied authority but that it was his duty to bid at the sale on behalf
of all bondholders. "It is the universal rule of law," the court said,
"that a trustee is in duty bound to see that the property entrusted to
his care is not lost to the bondholders. Courts will take judicial notice
that property sold under foreclosure seldom, if ever, brings a figure at
all commensurate with its value, that under the present financial con-
dition of the country, there is a great depression in the values of real
estate, that a foreclosure sale of property will bring far less now than
in normal times. * * * In these circumstances we think the property in
question ought not to be sold at a price which will result in gross loss
to the bondholders, if it can be avoided by having the property bid in
for the amount of the indebtedness, by the trustee, for their use and
benefit."' To read this excerpt, indeed to read the entire opinion, one
would think that if the trustee purchase were not ordered, the property
would be sold to an outsider for whatever it would bring and the bond-
holders would lose everything but a nominal cash distribution.
O First National Bank v. Neil, 137 Kan. 436, 20 P. (2d) 528, 534 (1933).
7Straus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 273 Ill. App. 63 (1933).
8 Straus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., supra, note 7, p. 67.
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In an able discussion of the subject of the protection of minority
bondholders in foreclosures and receiverships by Mr. Wilbur G. Katz
in an article in the University of Chicago Law Review'D the author
discusses the effect of this holding of the Illinois court. He says: "The
decision of the Illinois Appellate Court in Straus v. Chicago Title &
Trust Company came in 1933 when some reorganizations had been
effected through the usual committee procedure and many others were
ready for the final steps. The suggestion that it might be the duty of
a trustee to bid if no sale could be had at the full value of the prop-
erty was a complete surprise to the bar. Damage suits were instituted
on behalf of non-assenting bondholders against trustees who had failed
to do so. Counsel for committees, after some months of confusion,
adopted rather generally the expedient of making all bondholders
parties to the foreclosure suit individually or by representation in
order to secure a binding adjudication as to the necessity of a bid by
the trustee."
About a year after the decision in the Straus case, the case of
Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Bamburg'0 was decided and this
case reversed the principle and held that a trustee was not only under
no duty to bid at a sale but that he had no authority to bid even if
he wished to do so unless such authority was specifically conferred
upon him by the trust deed. The same principle was affirmed in Chicago
Title & Trust Company v. Robbin,= a recent case. The Straus case,
however, is interesting because it discusses the objections so frequent-
ly made by dissenting bondholders opposed to trustee purchase. It was
there contended by dissenting bondholders that under trustee purchase
bondholders would become tenants in common of the mortgaged prop-
erty which would thereupon be subject to liens of their judgment
creditors and to the inchoate rights of dower and urged the further
objection, to which I have already referred, that each of the bond-
holders, as tenants in common, would be entitled, as a matter of right,
to maintain an action for partition and that, therefore, the trustee could
not pass a merchantable title. That objection by dissenting bondholders
is not a valid one, certainly not in Wisconsin. But even if such tech-
nical objection were made, it can easily be overcome by provisions in
the judgment of foreclosure, which would readily obviate the objec-
tion that the title of the property would be incumbered or clouded by
judgments of the numerous beneficiaries of former bondholders or by
dower claims. The judgment of foreclosure permitting trustee purchase
therefore should expressly provide that the trustee holds as trustee of
9Katz, Protection of Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships (1936)
3 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 517.
' Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Bamburg, 278 Ill. App. 1 (1934).
11 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robbin, (Ill. 1935) 198 N.E. 4.
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an active trust and that the interests of the beneficiaries shall be solely
in the proceeds of the ultimate sale. In such cases it has been held that
the interests of the beneficiaries are personally for purposes of dower,
judgment liens and so forth. Courts have so held in the so-called land
trust agreement cases. Thus you determine by the decree of fore-
closure what might otherwise be left a troublesome matter if applica-
tion for authority of the trustee to purchase is deferred until hearing
upon petition before sale or if left to be passed upon by the court
upon confirmation. If the court has power to authorize such purchase,
it has power to declare the result to be an active trust with all of the
characteristics of such trust declared by Section 231.16 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes, which reads as follows: "Every express trust, valid as
such in its inception, except as herein otherwise provided, shall vest
the whole estate in the trustees, subject only to the execution of the
trust; and the person for whose benefit the trust was created shall
take no estate or interest in the lands, but may enforce the perform-
ance of the trust."
I am not contending that by virtue of this statute the trustee
becomes the trustee of an active trust after purchase at foreclosure
sale, but merely point to it to show that after the court by its decree
extends the active trust already created by the trust deed, even the
characteristics of the trust outlined by the section continue to obtain.
But the power itself to make such provision must be found in the
inherent power of the equity court to protect bondholders under a trust
deed and cestuis generally. The provisions in the decree of foreclosure
should be made to provide, and usually does, that the trustee get a
deed and "hold, manage, operate, lease, sell, and convey and otherwise
deal with the real estate in question as such trustee, for the use and
benefit of the owners and holders of the outstanding bonds and interest
coupons subject, however, to the further order and direction of the
court," and it should be further ordered and decreed that the "right,
title and interest of the owners and holders of said bonds and interest
coupons in said trust be and are declared to be personal property and
not real estate, and the only right, title and interest of bondholders
to any assets of said trust shall be to receive their proportionate share
of the income, proceeds and avails of said real estate or other assets
of the trust."
I have discussed the Straus case because of its interesting discus-
sion of the development of the rule but lest I have given the impres-
sion by that case that Illinois adheres to the doctrine that the trustee
may purchase for bondholders in the absence of express authority in the
trust deed, I should here call attention to the fact that in Chicago Title
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& Trust Company v. Robbin,'2 decided June 18, 1935, the supreme
court of that state, putting its decision on the broad ground that the
court of equity lacked jurisdiction to order trustee purchase in the
absence of appropriate provision in the trust mortgage, definitely dis-
approved the doctrine in the Straus case, an intermediate appellate
court decision, and apparently outlawed trustee purchases entirely in
Illinois whether sought by a majority, as was the case in Lieberman
v. Schoenlenk, 3 or by the minority where no express provision there-
fore has been made by the trust deed.
An objection frequently made by dissenting bondholders is that
after sale, the trustee holds title merely of a dry and passive trust.
This objection too becomes rather academic when we consider that it
may easily be overcome by appropriate provisions in the foreclosure
judgment. In a recent Connecticut case, Hoffmann v. First Bond &
Mortgage Company of Hartford, Inc.,' 4 the court squarely met this
objection by saying: "Clearly up to the time of foreclosure sale, the
defendant was and acted as trustee of an express trust created by the
mortgage, with active powers and duties thereunder. No express pro-
vision is made for subsequent sale by the trustee in case of its own
purchase at the foreclosure sale, and the appellant maintains that upon
such purchase the defendant became a mere passive depositary of the
property and holds the bare legal title without discretion and without
active duties, so that the cestuis que trustent are entitled to possession
of the property and may call upon the trustee for a conveyance of
the legal estate. * ** It would be absurd to regard the trustee's duty as
terminated at the very time when its protection would be most needed.
* ** In an emergency a court of equity may, for the preservation of
the trust and the protection of the beneficiaries from loss, even author-
ize a trustee to depart from the terms of the agreement."
An instance of the exercise of this power by a court of equity to
authorize a departure from the provisions of a trust deed is seen in a
recent decision in a New Jersey court, New Jersey National Bank v.
Lincoln Mortgage Company,'5 where the court used this striking lan-
guage: "It is of course quite true that ordinarily the trustee is bound,
in the administration of the trust, by the terms of the trust, and that
even this court has no right to authorize the trustee to depart there-
from; but it is also true that a court of equity, in its capacity as uni-
versal trustee, may in cases of emergency, for the preservation of the
12 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robbin, (Ill. 1935) 198 N.E. 4.
13 Lieberman v. Schoenlank, 279 Ill. App. 467 (1935).
1 4 Hoffman v. First Bond & Mortgage Co. of Hartford, 116 Conn. 320, 164 Ati.
656, 657, 658 (1933).
15 New Jersey National Bank v. Lincoln Mortgage Co., 105 N.J. Eq. 557, 148
Ati. 713, 715 (1930).
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trust estate and the protection of the cestuis, authorize and direct the
trustees to do acts which under the terms of the trust and under ordi-
nary circumstances they would have no power to do. This power
resides in the Court of Chancery as a part of its original inherent
jurisdiction-its general administrative jurisdiction in cases of trusts."
But this broad view of the equity power of the court has by no means
been generally recognized. And we must not lose sight of the fact that
there is sharp division in the authorities and it may be somewhat
difficult to say on what side lies the weight of authority.
The federal courts, the courts of Michigan, Colorado and now
Illinois take the opposite view. The Michigan Supreme Court in a
recent decision in Detroit Trust Company v. Stormfeltz-Lovely Com-
pany,1 held unconstitutional a statute empowering the trustee to bid
where the trust deed lacked such provision. A federal case frequently
cited is Werner, Hatrris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Company. The
court in that case affirmed the decision of the trial court refusing to
confer upon the trustee authority to bid for the benefit of all bond-
holders where the trust deed contained no provision authorizing him
to do so. The court said: "The trust deed contained no provision
authorizing the trustee to bid at the sale for and on behalf of the
bondholders. * * * Upon due consideration of the matter, the trial
court correctly came to the conclusion that there was no power in the
court to compel the holder of a single bond to participate in a bid
for the property, if he did not wish to do so; that the rights of bond-
holders were measured by their bonds and the trust deed securing the
same, and, absent any provision therein authorizing the trustee to bid
for and on behalf of the bondholders, there was no power in the
courts to confer such authority upon the trustee. * * * Each bond-
holder has the absolute right to determine for himself, in case of
default, whether he shall take his loss and quit, or continue to gamble;
if the property is sold at public sale, he has a right to take his propor-
tion of the best bid that can be secured in cash and cannot be com-
pelled to become an owner of an undivided interest in the property."
The obvious comment upon this decision is of course that a bond-
holder should not, as a practical matter or a matter of justice, to other
bondholders, have the absolute right to determine for himself, in case
of default, whether he shall take his loss and quit or continue to
gamble.
The Colorado Supreme Court in denying the right of the trustee to
purchase for bondholders sarcastically characterized the situation fol-
'r Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 242 N.W. 227
(1932).
" 1Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Company, 35 F. (2d) 513, 514
(C.C.A. 10th, 1929).
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lowing trustee purchase as "a glorified receivership.""' The Michigan
case I have referred to is interesting. The court declared the statute
authorizing purchase by the trustee unconstitutional largely on the
ground that it impaired the contract rights of the non-assenting bond-
holders. The statute was further held objectionable because it provided
a special type of proceeding but failed to require any notice to non-
assenting bondholders. The court held that the act seriously impaired
the obligation of contract of the non-assenting bondholders because
there was a deviation from the express trust created by the trust deed
under which the non-assenting bondholders are the cestuis. The court
seemed to recognize that a deviation from the express trust may be
upheld by a court of equity in an exigency or emergency not contem-
plated by the trust deed but held that the case did not present such an
emergency. The court said: "A bondholder has the right to insist upon
his contract, even if eventually he should fare worse by insisting upon
his share of a sale for cash together with the right to look to the
responsibility of the mortgagor for a proportionate share of the defi-
ciency. He is not bound to become an' owner in common of a bene-
ficiary interest of a trust which may run on for many years and from
which he may realize cash, stocks, bonds, or other securities, that
eventually may net him more or less than the amount he would have
received had the property been sold for cash."'"
The recent case of Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Robbin,20
already referred to, is constantly cited in support of the contention
that the trustee has no right to bid. It was determined in that case that
the powers granted to a trustee in a deed of trust are not to be liberally
construed, that the trustee's powers exist only in the terms creating
the trust and that the court has not the power to import into the
contract other or additional provisions or to extend the provisions.
The trial court, it was held, could not authorize the trustee to bid at
the sale over the protest of the holders of some of the bonds for the
reason that the trust deed required the sale to be for cash and conse-
quently the court was wholly without power to strip the bondholders
of their contract rights without consent and throw them into a joint
ownership venture. The court said: "The fact that a majority of the
bondholders wanted the trustee to bid makes no difference. * * * It is
our opinion that here the Chancellor had no inherent power to order
the trustee to bid at the foreclosure sale, and thus, in effect, make a
new contract between the parties." It is interesting to note here that
Is Cosmopolitan Hotel, Inc. v. Colorado Natil. Bank, 96 Colo. 62, 40 P. (2d)
245 (1935).
'19 Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 242 N.W. 227,
230 (1932).
20 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robbin, (Ill. 1935) 198 N.E. 4.
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the court in this case further held that a court of equity had no right
to fix an upset price, below which the property could not be sold, in
this respect differing radically from the principle laid down in our
Suring Bank case.2 oa
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not passed upon the pre-
cise question we have for discussion, it has clearly and emphatically
stated the rule with respect to duties of the trustee with respect to
vigilance and diligence in protecting bondholders when effectuating
the principal purpose of the trust deed. In Schroeder, trustee, v. Arcade
Theater Co.21 Justice Doerfler, writing the opinion, said: "Trustees
under the provisions of a trust deed in some respects represent the
bondholders and in other respects the mortgagors and still other
respects both bondholders and mortgagors." In that case the owner of
a 99 year lease on real estate erected a substantial building and placed
a large bond issue maturing five years from its date, and subsequently
made a fifteen year lease with a theater company, which expended
large sums in making alterations of the building. It was held that:
"The fact that representatives of the Theater Company before any
default in the conditions of the trust deed interviewed the trustee and
discussed the terms of the proposed lease and the trustee approved
both the lease and the proposed alterations did not make the trust deed
subject to the lease as the trustee was not authorized expressly or by
necessary implication by any of the provisions of the trust deed to
subject the trust deed to a subsequently made lease. '22 The court said:
"A further legal doctrine must be borne in mind, and that is that the
provisions of a mortgage are not personal to the party named in it as
mortgagee but are for the benefit and security of the real owner of the
debt secured thereby. * * * It becomes quite clear that in order to
ascertain and determine the rights of a trustee under a trust deed or
mortgage, it is necessary to look to and examine closely the provisions
of the trust deed, for under such trust deed there is created not only
the very office of the trustee but also his various duties, obligations,
and powers.12 3
At first blush it might appear that this case points to the denial
of the right of the trustee to purchase on behalf of all bondholders,
and indeed I notice that this case has been cited in one of the decisions
I have already referred to in support of the doctrine that the power of
the trustee must be strictly construed and that where no authority is
expressly given to bid at the sheriff's sale, no such authority exists.
The decision in the Arcade Theater case, however, does not stand for
2OaSuring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N.W. 556 (1934).
21 Schroeder v. Arcade Theater Co., 175 Wis. 79, 103, 184 N.W. 542 (1921).
22 Schroeder v. Arcade Theater Co., supra, note 21 at 80 (headnote.)
23 Schroeder v. Arcade Theater Co., supra, note 21 at 103.
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such proposition. It must be limited to the situation presented with
reference to the right of the lessee to subject a trust deed to a subse-
quently made lease. The right of a court of equity to extend the
powers of a trustee in an emergency in order to carry out effectually
the purpose of the trust presents an entirely different question.
The duty of the trustee to act with diligence and with the utmost
good faith for the protection of the bondholders under all circum-
stances is clearly pointed out in a number of decisions by our court.
In Dick & Reutermann Co. v. Hunholz,24 in holding that bondholders
were entitled to the appointment of a receiver even though the defaults
in the mortgagor's payment of interest, taxes and insurance did not
exceed the amount by which the principal of the mortgage debt had
been reduced by payments, the court indicated that bondholders
should be afforded this protection among other things because it said:
"* * * holders of bonds secured by a trust deed are hardly in the posi-
tion of a mortgagee who loaned his money on the strength of the
security of mortgaged premises. They are numerous and scattered.
* * * Individual bondholders are not in a position to buy in the prem-
ises at foreclosure sale and thus procure the property originally
accepted as security for the mortgage debt as the ordinary mort-
gagee." z
In Marshall & lsley Bank, Trustee v. Guaranty Investment Com-
pany26 the trust deed provided that the trustee had the right to advance
moneys to repair defaults by the mortgagor and a lien was to be
reserved to him for such advances prior to the lien of the trust deed.
It was determined in this case that if the trustee intends later to claim
the benefits of such a stipulation, he must notify the bondholders with-
in a reasonable time after such advances are made and that the defaults
have been so prevented or so repaired. Having failed so to do, the
claim of the trustee to priority over the bondholders was denied. In
denying the advances of the trustee, the court said: "This required
some consideration of the character and scope of the duties of such
trustees. It is frankly recognized that the law governing the relation-
ships involved in a trusteeship to secure a bond issue have not been
extensively or satisfactorily developed by the courts. * * * It is our
conclusion that the trustee under a bond issue does owe to the bond-
holders certain duties independently of the terms of the trust deed,
and that these duties will be imposed regardless of any exculpatory
lirovisions in the trust deed. Such a trustee has an obligation to exer-
2 4 Dick & Ruetermann Co. v. Hunholz, 213 Wis. 499, 252 N.W. 180 (1934).
25 Dick & Ruetermann Co. v. Hunholz, supra, note 24, at 506.
26 Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Investment Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N.W.
262 (1934).
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cise good faith as well as ordinary intelligence and vigilance in protect-
ing the interests of the bondholders.
2 7
The judgment of foreclosure, following the statute, of course pro-
vides that either party or any of the parties to the action may pur-
chase at the sale. It is sometimes contended that the trustee is such
a party even though the trust mortgage contains no express provision
authorizing him to bid in the property at foreclosure sale in behalf of
bondholders. It is claimed that the statute should be construed to
grant authority to do so and no provision is therefore necessary. This
contention, however, does not seem convincing. The statute should
be construed to mean that parties who are otherwise competent to do
so may bid. In fact a similar provision is contained in the statutes of
several of the states that have held that the trustee has no power to
bid.
Section 278.10 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides: "The sheriff or
referee upon confirmation of a sale, shall pay out of the proceeds of
the sale the costs thereof and to the plaintiff or his attorney the amount
adjudged due with interest or so much as the proceeds will pay; that
he take a receipt therefor and file the same, and that in case of a
surplus arising from the sale, the sheriff or referee shall bring the
same into court and if there be a deficiency report the amount thereof."
It is argued in opposition to the claim of the right of the trustee to bid
that these provisions by their very language and context, using as they
do the words "moneys," "pay," "proceeds," "surplus money," ''receipt,"
and "bring" have in contemplation a sale for cash and nothing else.
By Section 231.16, our statutes provide the title to a trust estate "Shall
vest the whole estate in the trustees, subject only to the .execution of
the trust; and the person for whose benefit the trust was created shall
take no estate or interest in the lands but may enforce the provisions of
the trust. The legal title vests in the trustee and the bondholders are not
necessarily parties to an action by the trustee to foreclose the prop-
erty." These statutes were applied literally in State ex. rel. Ashley v.
Circuit Court of Milwaukee County.2
It is argued, therefore, since the plaintiff trustee is the absolute
owner of the trust mortgage, there is no reason why he should not be
permitted to bid in the property at foreclosure sale to protect his inter-
ests therein. The arguments based on the provisions of the statutes,
however, do not seem to me as convincing and satisfactory as the con-
tention based upon the broad doctrine that the court of equity has
inherent power to extend the provisions of the trust deed in the event
27Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Investment Co., supra, note 26 at 421, 422.
- State ex rel. Ashley v. Circuit Court, 219 Wis. 38, 261 N.W. 737 (1935).
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of emergency in order to effectuate the purpose of the trust and pro-
tect the right of the bondholders.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, recognizing the right of
the trustee to bid at the sheriff's sale, states the rule as follows: "If
the trustee properly holds in trust a mortgage upon real property and
the mortgage is foreclosed, the trustee can properly purchase the prop-
erty on foreclosure, if it is prudent to do so in order to avoid a loss
although the trustee is not authorized to invest in the purchase of real
property. He is under duty, however, to sell the property when he has
reasonable opportunity to do so." 29
A consideration of the rules laid down by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court relative to the duties of trustees where bondholders are con-
cerned together with the general practice of equity, it seems to me,
indicate that the trial court should assume such power. From a practical
standpoint, while it cannot be said that trustee purchase has been a
panacea for all ills of the bondholders, experience in this state, I think
it may be fairly said, justifies the exercise of such authority on the
part of the trial courts,---at least in the ordinary case. Where a far
flung business enterprise may be involved, perhaps other practical
considerations might be controlling.
R ESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 231, Comment a.
1937]
